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Sufficient Acknowledgment Of Indebtedness To
Remove Bar Of Statute Of Limitation
Doughty v. Bane'
Plaintiff brought suit on a promissory note executed by
defendant on May 25, 1954, as security for the purchase
of stock. No request for payment of principal or interest
had been made between the date of the loan and March
18, 1959. Since the note, which was payable on demand,
was not under seal the applicable period of limitations was
three years from the date of the note's making.2 Subsequent the expiration of the statutory period plaintiff telephoned defendant and requested payment. During the
course of the conversation defendant admitted the possibility of indebtedness, after initially contending that he
did not remember anything about the note. Defendant
concluded by saying that at any rate he had no money,
and that the plaintiff would, have to take the matter to
an attorney.3
The plaintiff received a jury verdict in the Circuit Court
of Somerset County. In affirming the verdict of the Circuit
Court, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant's
admission of possible indebtedness, followed by his refusal to pay for lack of funds, was sufficient to permit a
jury to properly find that he had acknowledged, the existence of a debt which would otherwise have been barred
by the statute of limitations.'
'222 Md. 361, 160 A. 2d 609 (1960).
25 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 57, § 1. Cf. 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 57, § 3,
providing for a twelve year limitation on specialties.
Supra, n. 1, 364. Bayne's version of the conversation:
"Of course, after the usual greetings you always make when you make
a 'phone call, I asked him about the note and told him I needed the
money and that I would like to have the $2,000.00, plus interest.
At first he said he didn't remember the note. Then after I refreshed
his memory he said, 'Well, possibly I did sign it. But don't you
think I have lost enough?' I said, 'Yes, I realize you have lost quite
a bit.' 'But', I said, 'this $2,000.00 that I personally loaned you is
a lot of money to me.' He said, 'Well, I can't pay you.' I proceeded
to go ahead. I said, 'I want my money.' You said you would be liable
for It.' 'And', I said, 'I want my money. I need my money.' He said,
'Well, I haven't got it. I can't pay it. If you want to take it to an
attorney and see what he can do about it, all right.'"
4 The Court of Appeals, in Oliver v. Gray, 1 H. & G. 204, 216-217 (,Md.
1827), established the general rule for the revival of debts barred by the
statute of limitations:
"... that the Act does not extinguish the debt, but only bars the
remedy and that an acknowledgment by the defendant of the debt,
or a promise to pay it within the time prescribed, is sufficient to
revive. * * * An acknowledgment of the debt with a naked refu8al to
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The opportunity of enforcing a valid claim after a
stated, period is denied by a legislature's prescribing a
time limit on the assertion of rights.5 The primary consideration underlying such legislation is one of fairness to
the debtor, for there comes a time when a party ought
to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has
been wiped clean 6 and that he will not be called upon to
defend a claim when "evidence has fbeen lost, memories
have failed, and witnesses have disappeared."7 However,
a statute of limitations normally does not operate to extinguish the defendant's obligation; it merely bars the
plaintiff's remedy at law.8
To relieve the harshness of the statute of limitations,
the English common law courts, at an early date, seized
upon the action of general assumpsit to allow the plaintiff to recover on an express promise to pay an antecedent
debt barred by the statute of limitations. 9 This doctrine
of revival now extends to those claims originally cognizable at common law under the action of general assumpsit. 1°
pay, or a refusal accompanied with an ewcuse for not paying it,
which in itself implies an admission that the debt remains due, and
furnishes no real objection to the payment of it, is sufficient."
(Emphasis added.]
'.See Comment, Developments In The Law - Statutes of Limitations,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1185 (1950).
6Holmes, The Path of The Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 477 (1897),
states:
"... the foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to
be looked for in the position of the person who gains them and not
in the loser. ... A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your
own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in
your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the
act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law
can ask no better justification than the deepest instinct in man."
'Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321
U.S. 342, 349 (1944), quoted in Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. 83, 92,
48 A. 2d 438 (1959).
' Frank v. Wareheim, 177 Md. 43, 7 A. 2d 186 (1939); Donaldson v.
Raborg, 26 Md. 312 (1867); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Clark, 19 Md.
509 (1863) ; Oliver v. Gray, 1 H. & G. 204 (Md. 1827) ; Barney v. Smith,
4 H. & J. 485 (Md. 1819).
9 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1957) § 160, 661. See also Kocourek,
"A Comment on Moral Consideration and the Statute of Limitations", in
SELECTED READINGS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 521, where the
author gives a resume of the various theories advanced in support of the
doctrine of revival. See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §§ 85, 86,
pp. 100, 101.
'0 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1957) § 188, 594. The major categories of revivable promises are: express or implied promises to pay
money, Luther & Morgan v. Payne, 197 Ky. 359, 247 S.W. 39 (1923);
and quasi contractual obligations, In re Stratman's Estate, 231 Iowa 480,
1 N.W. 2d 636 (1942). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 86 (1).
Maryland, by its legislative recognition of a difference in rules as to
the limitations of simple contract claims, 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 57,
§ 1, and actions on bonds, judgments and specialties, 5 MD. CODE (1957)
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To revive a cause of action barred by the statute of
limitations, a majority of the American jurisdictions will
accept an unconditional promise to pay the debt; a conditional promise to pay, where there is evidence that the
condition has been performed; or a mere acknowledgment of the debt from which a new promise to pay may
be implied." In a few states, the courts have construed
statutes as removing the defense of limitations from any
defendant who acknowledges a subsisting indebtedness,
notwithstanding the absence of any facts from which a
willingness to pay could be implied.1 2
Maryland requires, as do other jurisdictions, that an
acknowledgment, to be legally sufficient, consist of a "clear,
distinct and unqualified admission of a subsisting debt,"' 34
evidence of which must be considered in its entirety.'
But earlier cases seem to indicate, in accord with the
holding in the instant case, that a peculiar doctrine prevails in Maryland, to the effect that an acknowledgment
of indebtedness is sufficient to toll the statute in spite of a
Art. 57, § 3, has aligned itself with those jurisdictions which will not
revive an obligation on a specialty after it has been barred by limitations.
See McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155, 40 A. 2d 313
(1944), noted in 8 Md. L. Rev. 294 (1944); Felty v. Young, 18 Md. 163
(1862); Young v. Mackall, 4 Md. 362 (1853); and Veasey's Admr. v.
Bassett's Admr's., 7 H. & J. 461 (Md. 1822), which recognize and discuss
the difference between the revival of limitations on simple contract claims
and actions on bonds, judgments and specialties. Although an express
promise may be admitted as evidence of consideration in an action based
on the new promise, such promises have been held insufficient to revive
the antecedent obligation once barred by limitations. Frank v. Wareheim,
177 Md. 43, 7 A. 2d 186 (1939). Despite an absence of direct authority as
to the Court's construction of the statutes as applied to money judgments, the Court, by indicating its inclination to accord similar treatment
to actions on bonds. judgments and specialties, Brooks v. Preston, 106
Md. 693, 68 A. 294 (1907), seems likely to refuse revival of such claims.
1 Custy v. Donlan, 159 Mass. 245, 34 N.E. 360 (1893) ; Easton v. Gidler,
28 Wash. 2d 674, 183 P. 2d 780 (1947) ; 34 Am. Jur. 233, 234, Limitations
of Actions, § 290, n. 1. See also 1 'WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1957)
§ 162.
Lord Tenterden's Act, 9 George IV., c. 14 (1833), required that new
promises and acknowledgments be in writing. Most states have enacted
similar statutes, but Maryland is among those states which has no.
"E.g., Fort Scott v. Hickman, 112 U.S. 150 (1884) ; Nelson v. Hanson,
92 Ia. 356, 60 N.W. 655 (1894); Bennet-Brewer Hardware v. Wakeman,
160 La. 407, 107 So. 286 (1926); Devereaux v. Henry, 16 Neb. 55, 19
N.W. 697 (1884); Cleland v. Hostetter, 13 N.M. 43, 79 P. 801 (1905);
Weir v. Bauer, 75 Utah 498, 286 P. 936 (1930).
ICrawford v. Richards, 197 Md. 289, 293, 79 A. 2d 143 (1951) ; Owings
v. Dayhoff, 159 Md. 403, 415, 151 A. 240 (1926).
AHigdon v. Stewart, 17 Md. 105, 111 (1861)
("As we have said, the
declaration of acknowledgment must be taken as a whole, and it cannot
be disproved as to any part; offered by the plaintiff as his proof, he will
not be allowed to adopt the admission and reject the qualification.
).
'See also Stockett v. Sasscer, 8 Md. 379 (1855).
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contemporaneous refusal to pay, unless that refusal is
based upon an excuse which would exempt the debtor
from a moral obligation to discharge the debt.1 5
Despite frequent litigation as to the application of the
unique Maryland position, there is no record of a Maryland
case involving the combination of facts present in the
instant case, i.e., the admission of possible indebtedness
followed by a refusal to pay because of a lack of money.
As the Court points out,'6 the defendant's statements in
this case are subject to more than one interpretation. The
defendant argued that his statements can be divided into
three component parts: (1) that he did not remember the
note; (2) that he may possibly have signed it; (3) that at
any rate, he had no money, he could not pay, and therefore
the plaintiff would have to take the matter to an attorney.
The first statement, the defendant pointed out, was
clearly not an acknowledgment of a subsisting debt. Therefore, he argued, his admission of possibly signing the note
must have been the basis of the plaintiff's case. To refute
the validity of such an allegation, he asserted that a statement of this nature is not the clear, distinct, and unqualified admission demanded by the Court in previous cases,
and he cited Higdon v. Stewart'7 as being analogous to the
instant case. In that decision the Court said:
"He said he did not think he owed anything; again,
that he did not think he owed more than fifty dollars;
which we take to mean this, that he thought he owed
nothing, but if he owed anything, it was not more
than the sum stated. If we say that, under this loose
conversation, the plaintiff may recover a thousand
'Crawford
v. Richards, 197 Md. 289, 79 A. 2d 143 (1951) (defendant's
expression of willingness to renew promissory notes executed by him at
an earlier date held not to be an unconditional promise to pay, where
they were expressly conditioned on a complete compromise between the
parties, which was never reached) ; Knight v. Knight, 155 Md. 243, 141 A.
706 (1928) (statement by a debtor that as soon as he sold his business he
intended to pay the debt, held a sufficient acknowledgment to remove the
bar of the statute of limitations) ; Stockett v. Sasscer, 8 Md. 535, 175 A.
602 (1855) (defendant's agreement not to plead limitations to a just
claim, coupled with a statement that the plaintiff's claim was not just,
held insufficient to take the claim out of the statute).
See also Nardo v. Favazza, 206 Md. 122, 110 A. 2d 676 (1955) ; Brown
v. H=ebb, 167 Md. 535, 175 A. 602 (1934); Beeler v. Clark, 90 Md. 221,
44 A. 1038 (1899) ; Higdon v. Stewart, 17 Md. 105 (1861). In none of the
cases cited has the Court recognized an acknowledgment as reviving a
barred claim where the defendant has explicitly refused to recognize a
moral obligation to pay the debt. See also 1 W~mLSTON, CONTRACTs (Rev.
ed. 1936) § 167; and 54 C.J.S. 383, Limitation of Actions, § 313.
6 Supra, n. 1, 366.
'17 Md. 106 (1861).
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or more dollars, if the plaintiff can prove that much
as originally due, would it not be turning the man's
words into something he did not say, by construing his
admission, qualified as it was, into a promise to pay
a much larger amount, which his other remarks clearly,
as we think, showed he deemed an unjust demand?
It is of no consequence that he did not speak confidently of owing nothing, but merely expressed his
opinion. The plaintiff offers these opinions, and cannot
discard them from consideration any more than other
parts of the conversation."' 8
The defendant submitted that the meaning normally attributed to the phrases "I don't think I did" and "possibly
I did" are similar, and that in fact the phrases are often
used interchangeably and in conjunction with one another.
However, the Court felt the phrases were clearly distinguishable. It emphasized the fact that the Higdon case
contained a direct denial of the debt, while in the instant
case the debtor said he did not remember the note but
admitted the possibility of his signing it. 19
Moreover, the defendant contended that his statements
as to the possibility of indebtedness were merely recitals
of a past occurrance rather than the acknowledgment of
a subsisting debt. Relying on the case of Owings v. Dayhoff, ° the defendant cited the following comments of the
Court in that case:
"The mere fact that the Defendant's decedent had
declared that the Plaintiff had 'worked for him and
performed services' was certainly not an acknowledgment of a subsisting debt, but at most a mere narrative of a past occurrence. To say that at some time a
person was in one's employ, or that one owned a certain automobile, or that a contractor had built a home
for him, carries no implication that the employee or
the contractor or the automobile dealer has not been
paid."
In the instant case, the Court adopted the plaintiff's
contentions by placing great weight upon the conversation
which followed the defendant's admission of possible indebtedness. Examining all of the defendant's remarks together, the Court found his original statements could
18I., 112.

Supra, n. 1, 364.
159 Md. 403, 414, 151 A. 240 (1926).
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properly be interpreted as being subordinate to his subsequent refusal to pay -because of financial difficulties. His
last words showed that he acknowledged the note was
his, and that
the only reason he could not pay was a lack
21
of money.
A majority of jurisdictions have 'held that an acknowledgment of indebtedness coupled with a refusal to
pay qualifies the admission so as to prevent the implication
of a promise to pay. 22 Generally, courts in these jurisdictions will not find that a debtor has waived the defense
of limitations unless the acknowledgment is supported by
some indication that the debtor is shouldering his obligation to pay the antecedent debt, which thus survives the
technical bar of the statute. In holding that the continued
existence of a debt carries an implied assumpsit raised by
law, which is not rebutted by a refusal to pay, the position
of the Maryland Court represents an extension of the
doctrine of acknowledgment as it is presently applied in
other jurisdictions.23
RONALD

M.

NADITCH

21The Court has held that a mere declaration of inability to pay a debt
does not vitiate an otherwise sufficient acknowledgment. Nardo v. Favazza,
206 Md. 122, 110A. 2d 676 (1955).
1 WiT.ISTroN, CoNTuAcTs (3rd ed. 1957) § 168.
2 The Court held in Knight v. Knight, 155 Md. 243, 249, 141 A. 706
(1928), quoting the case of Oliver v. Gray, 1 H. & G. 204, 218 (Md. 1827) :
"'When, therefore, a party admits the debt ito be due, but standing
upon the act of limitations alone, in the same breath refuses to pay it,
he admits a case, to which the act, according to its spirit and reason,
does not apply, under the interpretation given to it, and his refusal
cannot avail him. But the continuing existence of the debt continues and carries with it the implied assumpsit that the law raises,
which is not rebutted by his refusal to pay.'"

